Django Path Traversal in FileResponse

High Risk Path Traversal

djangopythonpath-traversalfileresponsedirectory-traversalfile-download

What it is

The Django application uses FileResponse with user-controlled file paths from request data without proper validation, enabling path traversal attacks. Attackers can manipulate file paths in requests to access files outside the intended directory structure, potentially exposing sensitive system files, configuration data, database files, or other restricted content through the FileResponse mechanism.

Language:

# Vulnerable: FileResponse with user-controlled paths

from django.http import FileResponse, JsonResponse, Http404
from django.views import View
from django.conf import settings
import os

# Dangerous: Direct file serving with user input
class FileDownloadView(View):
    def get(self, request, file_id):
        filename = request.GET.get('filename', '')
        path = request.GET.get('path', '')
        
        # CRITICAL: User controls file path
        if path:
            file_path = os.path.join(settings.MEDIA_ROOT, path, filename)
        else:
            file_path = os.path.join(settings.MEDIA_ROOT, 'downloads', filename)
        
        try:
            return FileResponse(open(file_path, 'rb'), as_attachment=True, filename=filename)
        except FileNotFoundError:
            raise Http404('File not found')

# Another dangerous pattern
def serve_user_document(request):
    doc_path = request.POST.get('document_path', '')
    
    # Dangerous: Direct path from request
    full_path = os.path.join('/var/documents', doc_path)
    
    try:
        response = FileResponse(open(full_path, 'rb'))
        response['Content-Disposition'] = f'attachment; filename="{os.path.basename(doc_path)}"'
        return response
    except Exception as e:
        return JsonResponse({'error': str(e)})

# Report download with path traversal
def download_report(request):
    report_type = request.GET.get('type', '')
    date = request.GET.get('date', '')
    format_type = request.GET.get('format', 'pdf')
    
    # Dangerous: User-controlled path construction
    report_filename = f'{report_type}_{date}.{format_type}'
    report_path = os.path.join(settings.MEDIA_ROOT, 'reports', report_filename)
    
    if os.path.exists(report_path):
        return FileResponse(open(report_path, 'rb'), as_attachment=True)
    
    return JsonResponse({'error': 'Report not found'})

# Backup file access
def download_backup(request):
    backup_name = request.GET.get('backup', '')
    directory = request.GET.get('dir', 'daily')
    
    # Dangerous: Multiple user inputs in path
    backup_path = f'/backups/{directory}/{backup_name}'
    
    try:
        return FileResponse(open(backup_path, 'rb'), as_attachment=True, filename=backup_name)
    except FileNotFoundError:
        return JsonResponse({'error': 'Backup not found'})

# Log file download
def download_log(request):
    log_name = request.GET.get('log', '')
    server = request.GET.get('server', 'web')
    
    # Dangerous: Server and log name from user
    log_path = f'/var/log/{server}/{log_name}.log'
    
    if os.path.exists(log_path):
        return FileResponse(open(log_path, 'rb'), as_attachment=True)
    
    raise Http404('Log file not found')

# Configuration file download
def export_config(request):
    config_file = request.POST.get('config_file', '')
    environment = request.POST.get('environment', '')
    
    # Dangerous: Config path from user input
    config_path = os.path.join(settings.BASE_DIR, 'config', environment, config_file)
    
    try:
        response = FileResponse(open(config_path, 'rb'))
        response['Content-Type'] = 'application/octet-stream'
        response['Content-Disposition'] = f'attachment; filename="{config_file}"'
        return response
    except Exception:
        return JsonResponse({'error': 'Config export failed'})

# Secure: Safe FileResponse with validation

from django.http import FileResponse, JsonResponse, Http404
from django.views import View
from django.conf import settings
from django.core.exceptions import ValidationError
from pathlib import Path
import os
import re

# Safe: Validated file download
class SafeFileDownloadView(View):
    def get(self, request, file_id):
        try:
            # Validate file ID
            validated_file_id = self.validate_file_id(file_id)
            
            # Get file info from database or allowlist
            file_info = self.get_file_info(validated_file_id)
            
            # Construct safe file path
            safe_path = self.get_safe_file_path(file_info)
            
            # Serve file securely
            return self.serve_file_safely(safe_path, file_info)
        except ValidationError as e:
            return JsonResponse({'error': str(e)}, status=400)
        except FileNotFoundError:
            raise Http404('File not found')
    
    def validate_file_id(self, file_id):
        # Validate file ID format
        if not file_id or not file_id.isdigit():
            raise ValidationError('Invalid file ID')
        
        file_id = int(file_id)
        if file_id <= 0:
            raise ValidationError('Invalid file ID')
        
        return file_id
    
    def get_file_info(self, file_id):
        # This would typically query a database
        # Using a mock allowlist for demonstration
        allowed_files = {
            1: {'filename': 'document1.pdf', 'path': 'documents'},
            2: {'filename': 'report.xlsx', 'path': 'reports'},
            3: {'filename': 'image.jpg', 'path': 'images'}
        }
        
        if file_id not in allowed_files:
            raise ValidationError('File not found')
        
        return allowed_files[file_id]
    
    def get_safe_file_path(self, file_info):
        # Define safe base directory
        downloads_dir = Path(settings.MEDIA_ROOT) / 'downloads'
        
        # Construct path using validated components
        file_dir = downloads_dir / file_info['path']
        file_path = file_dir / file_info['filename']
        
        # Validate path is within downloads directory
        try:
            resolved_path = file_path.resolve()
            downloads_dir_resolved = downloads_dir.resolve()
            
            resolved_path.relative_to(downloads_dir_resolved)
            return resolved_path
        except ValueError:
            raise ValidationError('File path outside allowed directory')
    
    def serve_file_safely(self, file_path, file_info):
        try:
            if not file_path.exists():
                raise FileNotFoundError('File not found')
            
            # Check file size
            max_size = 100 * 1024 * 1024  # 100MB
            if file_path.stat().st_size > max_size:
                raise ValidationError('File too large')
            
            # Serve file
            response = FileResponse(
                open(file_path, 'rb'),
                as_attachment=True,
                filename=file_info['filename']
            )
            
            return response
        except PermissionError:
            raise ValidationError('Access denied')

# Safe: Document serving with validation
def safe_serve_user_document(request):
    document_id = request.POST.get('document_id', '')
    
    try:
        # Validate document access
        validated_doc = validate_document_access(request, document_id)
        
        # Get safe file path
        file_path = get_safe_document_path(validated_doc)
        
        # Serve document
        return serve_document_safely(file_path, validated_doc)
    except ValidationError as e:
        return JsonResponse({'error': str(e)}, status=400)

def validate_document_access(request, document_id):
    # Validate document ID
    if not document_id.isdigit():
        raise ValidationError('Invalid document ID')
    
    document_id = int(document_id)
    
    # Check user access (mock implementation)
    if not request.user.is_authenticated:
        raise ValidationError('Authentication required')
    
    # This would typically check database permissions
    user_documents = [1, 2, 3]  # Mock user's accessible documents
    if document_id not in user_documents:
        raise ValidationError('Access denied')
    
    return {
        'id': document_id,
        'filename': f'document_{document_id}.pdf',
        'owner': request.user.id
    }

def get_safe_document_path(document_info):
    # Define safe base directory
    documents_dir = Path(settings.MEDIA_ROOT) / 'user_documents'
    
    # Construct safe path
    file_path = documents_dir / str(document_info['owner']) / document_info['filename']
    
    # Validate path
    try:
        resolved_path = file_path.resolve()
        documents_dir_resolved = documents_dir.resolve()
        
        resolved_path.relative_to(documents_dir_resolved)
        return resolved_path
    except ValueError:
        raise ValidationError('Document path outside allowed directory')

def serve_document_safely(file_path, document_info):
    try:
        if not file_path.exists():
            raise ValidationError('Document not found')
        
        response = FileResponse(
            open(file_path, 'rb'),
            as_attachment=True,
            filename=document_info['filename']
        )
        
        # Set security headers
        response['X-Content-Type-Options'] = 'nosniff'
        response['Content-Security-Policy'] = "default-src 'none'"
        
        return response
    except PermissionError:
        raise ValidationError('Access denied')

# Safe: Report download with allowlists
def safe_download_report(request):
    report_type = request.GET.get('type', '')
    date = request.GET.get('date', '')
    
    try:
        # Validate inputs
        validated_data = validate_report_request(report_type, date)
        
        # Get report file
        report_path = get_safe_report_path(validated_data)
        
        # Serve report
        return serve_report_safely(report_path, validated_data)
    except ValidationError as e:
        return JsonResponse({'error': str(e)}, status=400)

def validate_report_request(report_type, date):
    # Validate report type
    allowed_reports = ['sales', 'inventory', 'users', 'analytics']
    if report_type not in allowed_reports:
        raise ValidationError('Report type not allowed')
    
    # Validate date format
    if not re.match(r'^\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}$', date):
        raise ValidationError('Invalid date format')
    
    return {
        'type': report_type,
        'date': date,
        'filename': f'{report_type}_report_{date}.pdf'
    }

def get_safe_report_path(report_data):
    # Define safe reports directory
    reports_dir = Path(settings.MEDIA_ROOT) / 'reports' / report_data['type']
    
    # Construct file path
    file_path = reports_dir / report_data['filename']
    
    # Validate path
    try:
        resolved_path = file_path.resolve()
        reports_base = Path(settings.MEDIA_ROOT).resolve() / 'reports'
        
        resolved_path.relative_to(reports_base)
        return resolved_path
    except ValueError:
        raise ValidationError('Report path outside allowed directory')

def serve_report_safely(file_path, report_data):
    try:
        if not file_path.exists():
            raise ValidationError('Report not found')
        
        response = FileResponse(
            open(file_path, 'rb'),
            as_attachment=True,
            filename=report_data['filename']
        )
        
        response['Content-Type'] = 'application/pdf'
        return response
    except Exception:
        raise ValidationError('Report serving failed')

# Safe: Backup access with strict controls
def safe_download_backup(request):
    backup_id = request.GET.get('backup_id', '')
    
    try:
        # Only allow staff access
        if not request.user.is_staff:
            raise ValidationError('Access denied')
        
        # Validate backup access
        validated_backup = validate_backup_access(backup_id)
        
        # Get backup file
        backup_path = get_safe_backup_path(validated_backup)
        
        # Serve backup
        return serve_backup_safely(backup_path, validated_backup)
    except ValidationError as e:
        return JsonResponse({'error': str(e)}, status=400)

def validate_backup_access(backup_id):
    # Validate backup ID format
    if not backup_id.isdigit():
        raise ValidationError('Invalid backup ID')
    
    # This would query a database for valid backups
    valid_backups = {
        1: 'backup_20231201.tar.gz',
        2: 'backup_20231202.tar.gz',
        3: 'backup_20231203.tar.gz'
    }
    
    backup_id = int(backup_id)
    if backup_id not in valid_backups:
        raise ValidationError('Backup not found')
    
    return {
        'id': backup_id,
        'filename': valid_backups[backup_id]
    }

def get_safe_backup_path(backup_info):
    # Define safe backup directory
    backup_dir = Path(settings.BASE_DIR) / 'backups'
    
    # Construct file path
    file_path = backup_dir / backup_info['filename']
    
    # Validate path
    try:
        resolved_path = file_path.resolve()
        backup_dir_resolved = backup_dir.resolve()
        
        resolved_path.relative_to(backup_dir_resolved)
        return resolved_path
    except ValueError:
        raise ValidationError('Backup path outside allowed directory')

def serve_backup_safely(file_path, backup_info):
    try:
        if not file_path.exists():
            raise ValidationError('Backup file not found')
        
        response = FileResponse(
            open(file_path, 'rb'),
            as_attachment=True,
            filename=backup_info['filename']
        )
        
        response['Content-Type'] = 'application/gzip'
        return response
    except Exception:
        raise ValidationError('Backup serving failed')

💡 Why This Fix Works

See fix suggestions for detailed explanation.

Why it happens

Django views pass user-controlled data from request parameters directly to FileResponse without validation, enabling attackers to inject '../' sequences. Example: filename = request.GET['file']; return FileResponse(open(os.path.join(MEDIA_ROOT, filename), 'rb')) allows accessing any file.

Root causes

Using FileResponse with Unvalidated User Input for File Paths

Missing Path Normalization Before FileResponse Creation

Applications fail to normalize paths before serving files, allowing encoded traversal sequences to bypass validation. URL-encoded '../' (%2e%2e%2f) or double-encoded variants pass checks but resolve to traversal during file access in FileResponse.

Insufficient Filtering of Directory Traversal Sequences

Simple blacklist filtering like path.replace('..', '') fails against nested patterns '..../' or '....//' where one removal leaves '../'. Incomplete regex patterns miss encoded variants, allowing traversal to FileResponse through filter evasion.

Trusting User-Provided File Paths Without Verification

Applications accept relative paths assuming safety, but os.path.join('/base', '/etc/passwd') discards base when second argument is absolute. FileResponse then serves the absolute path, bypassing directory restrictions entirely through path manipulation.

Direct Use of Request Data in File Path Construction

Views build paths using f-strings or concatenation with request data: file_path = f'{MEDIA_ROOT}/{request.GET["path"]}/{request.GET["file"]}'; FileResponse(open(file_path, 'rb')). Multiple injection points enable traversal through any unvalidated parameter.

Fixes

Validate and Sanitize All File Paths Before Using with FileResponse

Use regex to enforce alphanumeric filenames: re.match(r'^[a-zA-Z0-9._-]+$', filename). Validate length limits, reject '..' sequences, and check file extensions against allowlists. Apply validation at form/serializer level before constructing paths for FileResponse.

Use Allowlists for Permitted File Names and Directories

Map user identifiers to actual filenames: ALLOWED_FILES = {'report1': 'monthly.pdf'}; actual = ALLOWED_FILES.get(file_id). Maintain database of allowed files with access controls. Only serve files explicitly listed, never construct paths from direct user input.

Implement Proper Path Resolution and Boundary Checking

Use Path.resolve() to get absolute paths, then verify with relative_to(): resolved = (base / filename).resolve(); resolved.relative_to(base). This catches traversal attempts where resolved path escapes base directory before FileResponse accesses file.

Use Indirect File References Instead of Direct Paths

Store files with UUID identifiers in database: UploadedFile.objects.get(id=uuid, user=request.user). Users provide UUIDs, application controls actual file paths. Return FileResponse(file_obj.file.open('rb')) where path never exposed to user manipulation.

Employ Django's Secure File Serving Mechanisms

Use FileField with upload_to for automatic path management: file = models.FileField(upload_to='documents/%Y/%m/'). Serve via FileResponse(document.file.open('rb')) after permission checks. Configure FileSystemStorage with explicit location boundaries for additional security.

Normalize Paths and Verify They Stay Within Allowed Directories

Decode URL encoding, normalize Unicode, and apply os.path.normpath() before validation. Check for traversal patterns after normalization. Use Path comparison to verify resolved path within allowed base before creating FileResponse.

Detect This Vulnerability in Your Code

Sourcery automatically identifies django path traversal in fileresponse and many other security issues in your codebase.

Scan Your Code for Free Explore More Vulnerabilities

Django Path Traversal in FileResponse

What it is

💡 Why This Fix Works

Why it happens

Root causes

Using FileResponse with Unvalidated User Input for File Paths

Missing Path Normalization Before FileResponse Creation

Insufficient Filtering of Directory Traversal Sequences

Trusting User-Provided File Paths Without Verification

Direct Use of Request Data in File Path Construction

Fixes

Validate and Sanitize All File Paths Before Using with FileResponse

Use Allowlists for Permitted File Names and Directories

Implement Proper Path Resolution and Boundary Checking

Use Indirect File References Instead of Direct Paths

Employ Django's Secure File Serving Mechanisms

Normalize Paths and Verify They Stay Within Allowed Directories

Django Path Traversal via os.path.join()

Django Path Traversal via open() Function

Path Traversal and Directory Access Vulnerabilities

Detect This Vulnerability in Your Code

Django Path Traversal in FileResponse

What it is

💡 Why This Fix Works

Why it happens

Root causes

Using FileResponse with Unvalidated User Input for File Paths

Missing Path Normalization Before FileResponse Creation

Insufficient Filtering of Directory Traversal Sequences

Trusting User-Provided File Paths Without Verification

Direct Use of Request Data in File Path Construction

Fixes

Validate and Sanitize All File Paths Before Using with FileResponse

Use Allowlists for Permitted File Names and Directories

Implement Proper Path Resolution and Boundary Checking

Use Indirect File References Instead of Direct Paths

Employ Django's Secure File Serving Mechanisms

Normalize Paths and Verify They Stay Within Allowed Directories

Related Vulnerabilities

Django Path Traversal via os.path.join()

Django Path Traversal via open() Function

Path Traversal and Directory Access Vulnerabilities

Detect This Vulnerability in Your Code